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The Market’s Law of Privacy: Case 
Studies in Privacy/Security Adoption 
Chetan Gupta* 
Abstract 
This paper examines the hypothesis that it may be possible for 
individual actors in a marketplace to drive the adoption of 
particular privacy and security standards. It aims to explore the 
diffusion of privacy and security technologies in the marketplace. 
Using HTTPS, Two-Factor Authentication, and End-to-End 
Encryption as case studies, it tries to ascertain which factors are 
responsible for successful diffusion which improves the privacy of 
a large number of users. Lastly, it explores whether the FTC may 
view a widely diffused standard as a necessary security 
feature for all actors in a particular industry.  
Based on the case studies chosen, the paper concludes that 
while single actors/groups often do drive the adoption of a 
standard, they tend to be significant players in the industry or 
otherwise well positioned to drive adoption and diffusion. The 
openness of a new standard can also contribute significantly to its 
success. When a privacy standard becomes industry dominant on 
account of a major actor, the cost to other market participants 
appears not to affect its diffusion.  
A further conclusion is that diffusion is also easiest in 
consumer facing products when it involves little to no 
inconvenience to consumers, and is carried out at the back end, yet 
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results in tangible and visible benefits to consumers, who can then 
question why other actors in that space are not implementing it. 
Actors who do not adopt the standard may also potentially face 
reputational risks on account of non-implementation, and lose out 
on market share.  
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I. Introduction 
The flâneur1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb provided the hypothesis 
for this paper, with his observation that all juice sold in the US is 
kosher, though only a small percentage of the population insists 
on kosher products.2 Taleb hypothesizes that intransigent 
                                                                                                     
 1.  “The figure of the flâneur [is] the stroller, the passionate wanderer 
emblematic of nineteenth-century French literary culture.” Bijan Stephen, In 
Praise of the Flâneur, PARIS REV. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2013/10/17/in-praise-of-the-flaneur/ (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I have 
never met Mr. Taleb, but I believe he would approve of being described thus, as 
opposed to an economist, philosopher, intellectual or statistician.  
 2.  See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Most Intolerant Wins: The 
Dictatorship of the Small Minority, MEDIUM (Aug. 14, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@nntaleb/the-most-intolerant-wins-the-dictatorship-of-the-
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minorities can dictate standards for society as a whole.3 This is 
partly due to the permeability of the chosen standard, and its 
unidirectional/asymmetric nature: kosher populations will only 
consume kosher products, but the broader population is happy to 
consume (knowingly or unknowingly) kosher and non-kosher 
products alike.4  
This led me to wonder if the same could be said to be true of 
various privacy and security standards. Can a minority industry 
actor prompt the adoption of a standard by the broader 
population? This is a tempting hypothesis, and almost romantic 
in its appeal. Lone privacy crusaders can stand against the 
indomitable tide of the information age and single-handedly save 
society from itself5—and from the technology that holds us in 
thrall. 
This paper proposes to examine the adoption patterns of 
technologies such as HTTPS, End-to-End encryption, and 2 
Factor Authentication to see what conclusions can be drawn as to 
                                                                                                     
small-minority-3f1f83ce4e15#.706a45fpu (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“A strange 
idea hit me. The Kosher population represents less than three tenth of a percent 
of the residents of the United States. Yet, it appears that almost all drinks are 
Kosher.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3.  See id. (“It suffices for an intransigent minority—a certain type of 
intransigent minorities—to reach a minutely small level, say three or four 
percent of the total population, for the entire population to have to submit to 
their preferences.”). 
 4.  See id. (“A Kosher (or halal) eater will never eat nonkosher (or 
nonhalal) food, but a nonkosher eater isn’t banned from eating kosher.”) 
 5.  Interestingly, empirical studies have shown that while young adults do 
have a fairly keen appreciation of privacy and value it, they “believe incorrectly 
that the law protects their privacy online and offline more than it actually does.” 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li & Joseph Turow, How Different are 
Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes 
and Policies? 4 (Rose Found. for Communities and the Env’t & Annenberg Sch. 
for Comm., Apr. 14, 2010), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. I also 
agree with the hypothesis that privacy harms are viewed as too diffused for 
individuals to rationally believe that it could happen to them, and to behave 
accordingly. This is similar to the herd immunity problem with respect to 
vaccination. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY 
LAW AND POLICY 222 (2016) (“[T]o enjoy the herd immunity from vaccination, 
almost everyone must be vaccinated. But individuals who decide to avoid 
vaccination undermine this herd immunity protection. For these individuals, 
avoidance of vaccines is rational, so long as they can still benefit from herd 
immunity.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for 
Cybersecurity, 140 DÆDALUS 70, 76 (2011) (discussing the herd immunity 
problem).  
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their uptake, the factors that drove their implementation, and 
the role of various market participants in their adoption. Through 
these case studies I hope to examine situations in which the 
market created (or failed to create) privacy enhancing standards. 
On the legal side, the adoption of privacy/security 
technologies can have implications for their regulation. 
Standards need not be set by regulatory bodies such as the FTC,6 
but can organically evolve within an industry as long as there is 
some diversity in attitudes towards privacy. Alternatively, it 
could also mean that once a standard is widely diffused, industry 
actors who fail to adopt or implement it are subject to regulation 
by the FTC under the “unfairness” doctrine. In the 2015 case of 
Wyndham,7 the FTC brought an action against the defendant for 
insecure data practices under both the “unfairness” and 
“deception” doctrines.8 In the Internet of Things (IoT) space, also, 
the FTC appears to be stepping up enforcement against 
companies that fail to secure their products against what the 
FTC views as market standards for privacy/security. For 
example, on January 5, 2017, the FTC brought a complaint in 
federal court against D-Link9 for failing to secure its routers and 
IoT cameras.10 The FTC has alleged that failures to secure the 
private key used to sign the defendant’s software, and storing 
login credentials as plain text on users’ mobile devices, are both 
practices which do not follow established market security 
standards, and has brought an ‘unfairness’ action under Section 5 
of the FTC Act on this basis.11  
                                                                                                     
 6.  US privacy avoids a prescriptive approach in general, with regulatory 
bodies and statutes preferring to hold regulated entities to some variant of a 
“reasonable measures” standard. Chandeni K. Gill, Note, Patron Data Privacy 
and Security in the Casino Industry: A Case for A U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 3 
UNLV GAMING L.J. 81, 107 (2012). 
 7.  FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 8.  See id. at 240 (“The FTC filed suit in federal District Court, alleging 
that Wyndham's conduct was an unfair practice and that its privacy policy was 
deceptive.”). 
 9.  Complaint, FTC v. D-Link Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00039 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
 10.  Id. at 2. 
 11.  See generally id. (alleging that D-Link’s practices are unfair and 
deceptive).  
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The hypothesis of particular market participants driving 
adoption is partially illustrated on a grander scale by the 
forthcoming European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) regime.12 The GDPR will lead to the world catering to the 
European conception of privacy and its associated safeguards, 
such as privacy by design (PbD). The diffusion of the GDPR 
standard will be driven by the large market segment that Europe 
represents. It is the 800-pound (kosher eating) gorilla in the 
privacy room. 
We can now consider how well the hypothesis works with 
respect to other privacy and security standards. 
II. “One of the Greatest Tragedies of Life is the Murder of 
Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts.”13 
Tempting as the hypothesis was, searching for real world 
examples soon made it clear that the diffusion of privacy/security 
standards worked slightly differently. While single actors/groups 
often do drive the adoption of a standard, they tend to be 
significant players in the industry or otherwise well positioned to 
drive adoption and diffusion.14 The openness of a new standard 
can also contribute significantly to its success.15 When a privacy 
standard becomes industry dominant on account of a major actor, 
                                                                                                     
 12.  Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
the European Union on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2016 O.J. 
L. 119 [hereinafter GDPR], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&qid=1490558317324&from=
en.  
 13.  Variously attributed to Ben Franklin and to Thomas H. Huxley, who 
wrote: “[T]he great tragedy of Science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by 
an ugly fact.” JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 505 (16th ed., Justin 
Kaplan ed., 1992) (quoting THOMAS H. HUXLEY, BIOGENESIS AND ABIOGENESIS 
(1870)). 
 14.  This is in line with Carl Shapiro’s hypothesis in Information Rules that 
established players who have achieved a degree of lock-in are better able to 
influence standards and adoption. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. 
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 
235–36 (1999) (discussing how "established incumbents" can influence 
technology standards). 
 15.  See id. at 201 (“In some industries with strong network characteristics, 
full openness is the only feasible approach.”). 
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the cost to other market participants appears not to affect its 
diffusion. This should be distinguished from “cost” to consumers, 
both in monetary terms and in terms of convenience.  
Diffusion is also easiest in consumer facing products when it 
involves little to no inconvenience to consumers, and is carried 
out at the back end, yet results in tangible and visible benefits to 
consumers, who can then question why other actors in that space 
are not implementing it. Actors who do not adopt the standard 
may also potentially face reputational risks on account of non-
implementation, and lose out on market share.16 
We can see how these findings are borne out by case studies 
in the next section. 
III. Case Studies 
a) HTTPS v. HTTP  
The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) was the default 
data communication protocol for the Internet. HTTP is not 
encrypted and is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle and 
eavesdropping attacks, which can let attackers gain access to 
website accounts and sensitive information and modify web pages 
to inject malware or advertisements.17  
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) encrypts data 
and is designed to withstand such attacks and is considered 
secure against them.18 Interestingly, HTTPS has been around 
                                                                                                     
 16.  Early adopters/first movers can design systems that play this to their 
advantage. SMSs received from (presumptively less secure) Android phones on 
(presumptively more secure) iPhones show up in a different color than messages 
from other iPhones. See Paul Ford, It’s Kind of Cheesy Being Green, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://medium.com/message/its-kind-of-cheesy-being-green-
2c72cc9e5eda#.jyaft5ots (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (noting that “Apple uses a 
soothing, on-brand blue for messages in its own texting platform, and a green 
akin to that of the Android robot logo for people texting from outside its 
ecosystem”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
presumptively less secure messages were described to me as “puke green.” 
 17.  See Tony Messer, HTTP vs. HTTPS: What's the Difference and Why 
Should You Care?, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/281633 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) 
(discussing the vulnerabilities of the HTTP protocol) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18.   See Michael Hernandez, HTTP vs. HTTPS for SEO: What You Need to 
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since 1994, when Netscape Communications created HTTPS for 
its Netscape Navigator web browser.19 The current version of 
HTTPS was formally specified in May 2000.20 Yet adoption was 
not widespread, and its historical use was limited to payment 
transactions and other sensitive transactions in corporate 
information systems.21  
On August 6, 2014, Google announced that it would start 
using the fact of whether a website had implemented HTTPS as a 
search engine optimization (SEO) criterion.22 Simply put, if your 
website is on HTTPS, it is more likely to show up in a google 
search and be higher in the list of results.  
After this, there was a rapid uptake in the implementation of 
HTTPS. Google proceeded to name and shame the top 100 (in web 
traffic terms) sites by documenting their HTTPS status in its 
Transparency Report.23 In December 2014, Google advocated 
displaying visual browser signals to users to let them know 
whether the sites they were visiting were on HTTP or HTTPS.24 
                                                                                                     
Know to Stay in Google’s Good Graces, AHREFS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://ahrefs.com/blog/http-vs-https-for-seo/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“Data 
sent using HTTPS is secured via Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS), 
which provides three key layers of protection: [encryption, data integrity, and 
authentication].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19.  See COLIN WALLS, EMBEDDED SOFTWARE: THE WORKS 344 (2005) 
(discussing the early history of HTTPS). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See HTTPS, DDOS-GUARD, https://ddos-
guard.net/en/info/knowledge/https (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“Historically, 
HTTPS connections were primarily used for payment transactions on the World 
Wide Web, e-mail and for sensitive transactions in corporate information 
systems.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22.  Zineb Ait Bahajji & Gary Illyes, HTTPS as a Ranking Signal, GOOGLE 
WEBMASTER CENTRAL BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://webmasters.googleblog.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-signal.html (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23.  HTTPS on Top Sites, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP., 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/grid/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24.  See Gregg Keizer, Google Wants to Turn Browser Signals of Web 
Encryption Upside Down, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 22, 2014, 3:50 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2861583/google-wants-to-turn-browser-
signals-of-web-encryption-upside-down.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) 
(“Chrome security engineers have proposed that all websites that don't encrypt 
traffic be marked as insecure by browsers.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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Google Chrome then began displaying a green lock next to 
websites that were secure on account of using HTTPS; Firefox 
and Internet Explorer did the same.25  
When this paper was written in November 2016, Google 
indicated that 52% of all web pages loaded worldwide on 
Windows machines are on HTTPS; the figure is 61% for Macs, 
55% for Linux, and 43% for Android.26 The more telling figure is 
the percentage of browsing time spent on HTTPS sites, that is, 
the sites that users actually interact with significantly on 
HTTPS.27 This figure is 69% for Windows, 71% for Macs, 80% for 
Linux, and 41% for Android.28 Google’s data is summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
 


















Websites as of 
January 2017 
Windows 39% 52% 70% 
Mac 43% 61% 72% 
Android 29% 45% 43% 
                                                                                                     
 25.  See Messer, supra note 17 (noting the “green” symbol in browsers’ URL 
bars that indicates whether the website uses the HTTP or HTTPS protocol). 
Iconography seems to play an important role in privacy UX design, with 
designers almost seeming to want to appeal to some subliminal Neanderthal 
part of our brains using color signaling. For more on this idea, see supra note 5. 
 26.  HTTPS Usage, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP., 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/metrics/?hl=en (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27.  As Gary Illyes, Google Webmaster Trends Analyst, pointed out in 
response to an article suggesting that the overall web adoption of HTTPS was 
still low, “it’s more important to have the sites people actually use to be 
https. Not all live domains are actually ‘sites.’” Gray Illyes (@methode), 
Twitter (Feb. 18, 2016 3:49 PM), https://twitter.com/methode/status/700406
914639753216. 
 28.  HTTPS Usage, supra note 26. 
 29.  The data in the table is derived from Google. Id. 
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Linux 44% 54% 81% 
Chrome 
OS 
45% 65% 75% 
 
Anecdotally, consider how many of the links in this paper are 
to HTTPS sites compared to HTTP! 
Migration to HTTPS is non-trivial, particularly for sites that 
host content from a variety of sources, such as advertisements or 
other partners, as all such external content also needs to be on 
HTTPS for Google Chrome and other browsers to mark such sites 
as totally secure.30 Otherwise, some variety of mixed content 
warning is displayed by browsers, such as a cross across a 
padlock or  a red padlock.31 As of January 2017, Google Chrome 
has started displaying the words “Secure” or “Not Secure” in the 
address bar depending on whether HTTPS is being used.32 
HTTPS requires a SSL certificate from a Certifying 
Authority (CA) in order to be implemented.33 Services such as 
Let’s Encrypt (backed by Google incidentally) offer such 
certificates for free, but other providers such as Symantec charge 
$1,499 per year for such certificates.34 “[E]ncrypting the 
                                                                                                     
 30.  See Brian Barret, Most Top Websites Still Don’t Use a Basic Security 
Feature, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/https-
adoption-google-report/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“For smaller sites, HTTPS 
can be a relatively simple thing to embrace; if they don’t implement it, it’s 
largely because they simply don’t care to. The more moving parts a site has, 
though, the trickier it gets.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31.  See, e.g., Check if a Site's Connection is Secure, CHROME HELP, 
https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95617?hl=en (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (providing the icons used in connection with a web page’s security status) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32.  Danielle Wiener-Bronne, Google Will Soon Call Out Websites for Not 
Being Secure, CNN TECH (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:34 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/technology/google-chrome-flag-non-secure-
sites/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Interestingly, CNN’s own site is not marked as “Not Secure” at the 
time of this paper’s writing. 
 33.  See Messer, supra note 17 (“If you are familiar with the backend of a 
website, then switching to HTTPS is fairly straightforward in practice. The 
basic steps are as follows. 1. Purchase an SSL certificate and a dedicated IP 
address from your hosting company.”) 
 34.  See Compare and Buy SSL Certificates, SYMANTEC, 
https://www.symantec.com/page.jsp%3Fid%3Dcompare-ssl-certificates (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (providing the prices of Symantec’s SSL services) (on file 
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transferred data—and especially the initial handshake to enable 
encryption—does costs bandwidth and CPU cycles.”35 “For large 
websites these minor costs might add up to a substantial 
amount.”36 
Google provides helpful guides on how websites can 
transition to HTTPS, and as noted above found several ways to 
nudge adoption.37 Carl Shapiro has hypothesized that open 
standards facilitate adoption, and where multiple standards 
exist, adoption follows a S-shaped curve, with rapid uptake once a 
market standard emerges, plateauing once market saturation is 
achieved.38 This certainly seems to be true of HTTPS, as the 
increase in usage from March 2015 to January 2017 set out in 
Table 1 would demonstrate.39 There seems to be a 10–20% 
increase in implementation of HTTPS across all major operating 
systems in less than a year. Let’s Encrypt reports that when it 
launched in December 2015, 39.5% of page loads on the Web used 
HTTPS (as measured by Firefox Telemetry).40 That number stood 
at 45% as of June 2016.41 
What is the takeaway from all of this? Once a major actor 
decided to drive adoption, and was well situated to do so, 
significant privacy and security benefits were delivered to 
consumers, with no action or effort required on their part. Google 
was well situated to drive adoption, both as a web traffic funnel, 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35.  Christoph Engelhardt, We Analyzed the HTTPS Settings of 10,000 
Domains and How It Affects Their SEO—Here’s What We Learned, AHREFS BLOG 
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://ahrefs.com/blog/ssl/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See Secure Your Site with HTTPS, GOOGLE SEARCH CONSOLE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/6073543?hl=en (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017) (instructing site owners how to implement the HTTPS protocol) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38.  See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 14, at 180 (noting that “the popular 
product with many compatible users becomes more and more valuable to each 
user as it attracts ever more users”).  
 39.  Supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 40.  Josh Aas, Progress Towards 100% HTTPS, June 2016, LET’S ENCRYPT 
(June 22, 2016), https://letsencrypt.org/2016/06/22/https-progress-june-
2016.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) ((on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 41.  Id. 
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and on account of being the designer of a very popular web 
browser. Google Chrome has a 59.24% market share as of October 
2016.42 
I predict that we will see a very similar scenario play out 
with respect to Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificates and 
Certificate Transparency (CT). “The [EV] identity verification 
process requires” an entity “to prove exclusive rights to use a 
domain, confirm its legal, operational and physical existence, and 
prove the entity has authorized the issuance of the Certificate.”43  
CT is another Google initiative meant to deal with the 
problem of wrongly issued certificates, and was prompted by 
several security incidents caused by fraudulent certificates, the 
most notorious of which was the DigiNotar incident in 2011.44 
The hacked DigiNotar certificates were used to impersonate 
numerous sites in Iran, such as Gmail and Facebook, which 
enabled the operators of the fake sites to spy on unsuspecting site 
users.45  
As explained on the CT website, which seems to be backed by 
Google: 
Certificate Transparency aims to remedy these certificate-
based threats by making the issuance and existence of SSL 
                                                                                                     
 42.  Browser Market Share Worldwide, STATCOUNTER, 
http://gs.statcounter.com/?PHPSESSID=37o3614ksusp3gttc6kni7a461 (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43.  What is an Extended Validation Certificate?, GLOBALSIGN, 
https://www.globalsign.com/en/ssl-information-center/what-is-an-extended-
validation-certificate/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 44.  See Josephine Wolff, How a 2011 Hack You’ve Never Heard of Changed 
the Internet’s Infrastructure, SLATE (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/12/how_the_2011_ha
ck_of_diginotar_changed_the_internet_s_infrastructure.html (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017) (“[DigiNotar’s] whole reason for existence was to tell internet users 
who and what they could trust—and in 2011, it failed spectacularly in that 
mission.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45.  See id. 
Thousands of Iranians who tried to visit Google websites in August 
2011 were apparently redirected to sites that looked like Google 
webpages and were also certified as belonging to Google according to 
certificates issued by DigiNotar. . . . Why bother redirecting hundreds 
of thousands of Iranian Google users to fraudulent websites? 
Probably in order to read their email. 
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certificates open to scrutiny by domain owners, CAs, and 
domain users. Specifically, Certificate Transparency has three 
main goals: 
 Make it impossible (or at least very difficult) for a CA 
to issue a SSL certificate for a domain without the 
certificate being visible to the owner of that domain. 
 Provide an open auditing and monitoring system that 
lets any domain owner or CA determine whether 
certificates have been mistakenly or maliciously 
issued. 
 Protect users (as much as possible) from being duped 
by certificates that were mistakenly or maliciously 
issued. 
Certificate Transparency satisfies these goals by creating 
an open framework for monitoring the TLS/SSL certificate 
system and auditing specific TLS/SSL certificates.46 
If a website has an EV certificate and CT, you will see the 
full name of the entity in the address bar in green in Google 
Chrome, along with a green padlock. For example, Twitter.com 
displays as “Twitter, Inc. (US),” followed by the HTTPS URL.47 
Google published a CT Policy in May 2016,48 and Facebook 
has also advocated for the standard after discovering flaws in 
some of its own certificates in April 2016.49 CAs price EV 
certificates at $599 per year,50 and tout claims such as “the green 
                                                                                                     
 46.  What is Certificate Transparency?, CERTIFICATION TRANSPARENCy, 
https://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Ironically, this site is on 
HTTP and has no EV. 
 47.  TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48.  See Ryan Sleevi, New CT Policy for Chrome Published - May 2016, 
CABFPUB (May 4, 2016), https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-
May/007573.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (discussing Google’s CT Policy) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49.  See Protect the Graph, Early Impacts of Certificate Transparency, 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-
graph/early-impacts-of-certificate-transparency/1709731569266987/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (“Facebook advocates for CT because it offers the ability to know 
the certificates a CT-enforcing browser will trust.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 50.  What is an Extended Validation Certificate?, supra note 43. 
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bar is proven to increase the feeling of security in 60% of 
shoppers.”51 
EV as a standard has been around since 2007,52 but for the 
same reasons as the rapid increase in HTTPS implementation, I 
anticipate that it will take off and become the dominant 
certificate standard over the next couple of years. The only 
publicly available data shows that in January 2015, EV 
certificates accounted for only 5% of all certificates.53 
b) It’s Not About the Privacy Stupid (?) 
As a coda, HTTPS has the (unintended?) benefit of 
preserving referrer data (where you landed on the website from) 
as long as you reached that page through another HTTPS page.54 
If you land on that page from a HTTP page, such referrer data is 
stripped away, and you are perceived as a “direct” traffic to the 
new page.55  
In the world of advertising, referrer data is tremendously 
valuable information, and would be a factor for pricing and 
serving online ads. Google’s ads engine is its largest single 
revenue source, and has been described as practically a license to 
print money.56 In 2015, Google's revenue amounted to $74.54 
                                                                                                     
 51.  Extended Validation (EV) SSL Certificates, SSL STORE, 
https://www.thesslstore.com/extended-validation-ssl-certificates.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). One 
wonders what the FTC would make of that last claim! 
 52.  ENTRUST DATACARD, THE BUSINESS VALUE OF EXTENDED VALIDATION 3 
(2015), https://www.entrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/WP-Extended-
Validation-Business-Benefits-FEB16-WEB.pdf. 
 53.  SSL Survey, NETCRAFT, https://www.netcraft.com/internet-data-
mining/ssl-survey/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 54.  See Hernandez, supra note 18 (“When traffic passes to an HTTPS site, 
the secure referral information is preserved.”).  
 55.  See id. (“[W]hen traffic passes through an HTTP site . . . it is stripped 
away and looks as though it is ‘direct.’”). HTTP to HTTP traffic has referrer 
data, as does HTTPS to HTTPS, but HTTP to HTTPS does not. 
 56.  See generally ANTONIO GARCÍA MARTÍNEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE 
FORTUNE AND RANDOM FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY (2016) for a fascinating 
insight into the evolution of online advertising, ad exchange mechanisms, and 
the role they play in dictating the business strategies of companies such as 
Google, Facebook and Twitter. Though jejune in other respects, the book serves 
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billion, of which $67.39 billion was advertising revenue.57 In this 
respect, widespread HTTPS adoption is arguably a less secure 
outcome for the end user, since it allows the users immediate 
browsing history to be shared between sites. Yet, it appears to 
have been widely adopted because of Google’s efforts and popular 
attention focusing on benefits rather than drawbacks. 
c) End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) for Instant Messaging Apps 
E2EE results in messages being encrypted between the end 
users of instant messaging (IM) apps, rather than being sent as 
insecure plain text.58 When correctly implemented, only users can 
read the messages, to the exclusion of the entity which operates 
the app, their mobile service provider, and governments.59 A less 
secure version of encryption only encrypts data between the user 
and the chat server; this is known as encryption in transit.60 As 
in the case of HTTPS, when Whatsapp introduced E2EE in 
                                                                                                     
as a great primer on the online ad world. 
 57.  Google’s Revenue Worldwide from 2002 to 2016 (in Billion U.S. 
Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-
global-revenue/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 58.  See Andry Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What Is End-to-End 
Encryption?, WIRED (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-end-encryption/ (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (noting that E2E “means that messages are encrypted in a 
way that allows only the unique recipient of a message to decrypt it, and not 
anyone in between”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59.  It is important to note that messages can still be accessed by third 
parties if they are unencrypted “at rest” on the user’s device itself. My friend 
Alex Urbelis thinks this is what happened with Whatsapp and the Turkish coup 
attempt, where End-to-End encrypted messages from the coup were published 
by the government. See Jeremy Seth Davis, WhatsApp in the Spotlight After 
Turkey Publishes Messages of Coup Officers, SC MEDIA (July 25, 2016), 
https://www.scmagazine.com/whatsapp-in-the-spotlight-after-turkey-publishes-
messages-of-coup-officers/article/529892/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (detailing 
the incident) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60.  See Barb Darrow, Security in a Time of Breaches? Microsoft Touts 
Beefed-up Database Encryption, FORTUNE (May 27, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/05/27/microsoft-sql-server-2016-encryption/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (defining encryption in transit) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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November 201461 and delivered enhanced security for over 1 
billion users, the technology was neither novel by itself, nor was 
it new to the IM space. Services such as Jabber had offered E2EE 
for many years prior to Whatsapp introducing it.62 Apple’s 
iMessage and twenty other IM apps out of the thirty-seven 
surveyed by the EFF in November 2014 offered E2EE.63 Jabber 
was part of Edward Snowden’s toolkit,64 but consider how 
involved and convoluted the instructions were for setting up 
secure IM communications as late as July 2015.65  
However, as with HTTPS, in terms of market dominance and 
standard diffusion, the relevant metric is the actual number of 
people who end up benefitting from a more secure standard. 
Whatsapp has a billion users.66 Strikingly, Viber, which has 823 
million users, implemented E2EE on April 19, 2016,67 only 
                                                                                                     
 61.  See moxie0, Open Whisper Systems Partners with WhatsApp to Provide 
End-to-End Encryption, OPEN WHISPER SYS. (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“Today 
we’re excited to publicly announce a partnership with WhatsApp, the most 
popular messaging app in the world, to incorporate the TextSecure protocol into 
their clients and provide end-to-end encryption for their users by default.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Whatsapp used the developers 
of Signal to help them implement E2EE. Though Signal may not have itself 
prompted the adoption of E2EE in IM apps, it offered an off the shelf solution 
when larger players did look to implement E2EE. 
 62.  See Frequently Asked Questions, JABBER, 
https://www.jabber.org/faq.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (detailing Jabber’s 
encryption offerings) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63.  Secure Messaging Scorecard, EFF, https://www.eff.org/node/82654 (last 
updated Apr. 5, 2016) (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 64.  I would surmise that the Snowden revelations were a key reason for 
many IM app developers to actually implement E2EE. This sits nicely with my 
original hypothesis as well. 
 65.  See Micah Lee, Chatting in Secret While We’re All Being Watched, 
INTERCEPT (July 14, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/14/communicating-
secret-watched/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (providing such instructions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66.  Joon Ian Wong, WhatsApp has a Billion Users, and It got There Way 
Quicker than Gmail Did, QUARTZ (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://qz.com/608014/whatsapp-has-a-billion-users-and-it-got-there-way-
quicker-than-gmail-did (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 67.  Michael Shmilov, Giving Our Users Control Over Their Private 
Conversations, VIBER BLOG (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.viber.com/en/blog/2016-
04-19/giving-our-users-control-over-their-private-conversations (last visited Apr. 
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fourteen days after Whatsapp completed rolling it out on April 5, 
2016.68 Though Viber claimed it had been working on E2EE for a 
long time, the timing is extraordinary. The following table 
summarizes E2EE/encryption in transit adoption among popular 
(in terms of number of users) IM apps: 
 
Table 2: E2EE in IM Apps 
 
                                                                                                     
24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68.  Jan & Brian, End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP BLOG (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Andy Greenberg, You Can All Finally Encrypt Facebook Messenger, 
So Do It, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/facebook-
completely-encrypted-messenger-update-now (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) 
(discussing Facebook’s introduction of encryption on its Messenger app, but 
noting that “the opt-in move has also drawn the scorn of privacy advocates”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Apr. 24, 2017 
 71.  Secure Messaging Scorecard, supra note 63. 
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d) Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) 
2FA requires users of a service to sign in using at least two of 
the following: something they know (their password for example), 
something they have (a code sent to their registered cell phone, a 
RFID token), and something they are (typically biometric 
fingerprint or iris scans).77 
2FA provides significantly enhanced security by being an 
effective foil to password hacks or disclosures. Mat Honan is a 
                                                                                                     
 73.  LINE Introduces Letter Sealing Feature for Advanced Security, LINE 
(Oct. 13, 2015), https://linecorp.com/en/pr/news/en/2015/1107 (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74.  The 320 million figure is from mid-2013 and represents the number of 
iCloud accounts linked to iMessage. Juli Clover, Apple Handles ‘Several Billion’ 
iMessages and 15 to 20 Million FaceTime Calls Daily, MACRUMORS (Feb. 28, 
2014, 9:49 AM), http://www.macrumors.com/2014/02/28/apple-40-billion-
imessages/ (last updated Feb. 28, 2014, 12:46 PM) (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).Apr. 24, 2017 
 75.  Micah Lee, Battle of the Secure Messaging Apps: How Signal Beats 
Whatsapp, INTERCEPT (June 22, 2016), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/06/22/battle-of-the-secure-messaging-apps-how-
signal-beats-whatsapp/  (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 76.  Michael Mimoso, New Signal App Brings Encrypted Calling to iPhone, 
THREAT POST (July 29, 2014), https://threatpost.com/new-signal-app-brings-
encrypted-calling-to-iphone/107491/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 77.  See generally Seth Rosenblatt & Jason Cipriani, Two-factor 
Authentication: What You Need to Know (FAQ), CNET (July 15, 2015, 1:39 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/two-factor-authentication-what-you-need-to-know-
faq/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (explaining two-factor authentication) (on file 
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technology journalist who writes for WIRED; in August 2012, 
using a single hacked password, attackers were able to take over 
Mat Honan’s “entire digital life.”78 Mat’s hacking raised questions 
about account security, and he stated that if his accounts had 
been protected by 2FA, the attackers would never have gotten as 
far as they did.79 
A large variety of sites and services implement 2FA, 
including LinkedIn, Dropbox, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, PayPal, 
Yahoo Mail, Steam and Microsoft Accounts.80 As currently 
implemented by most popular service providers, 2FA is opt in 
rather than the default choice.81  
Google introduced 2FA for its accounts in February 2011,82 
and nearly a quarter million Google account users chose to enable 
2FA in the two days after the Mat Honan story broke.83 While, no 
                                                                                                     
 78.  See Mat Honan, How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My 
Epic Hacking, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:01 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (“First my Google account was taken over, then deleted. Next my 
Twitter account was compromised . . . . And worst of all, my AppleID account 
was broken into, and my hackers used it to remotely erase all of the data on my 
iPhone, iPad, and MacBook.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 79.  See id. (“Had I used two-factor authentication for my Google account, 
it’s possible that none of this would have happened, because their ultimate goal 
was always to take over my Twitter account and wreak havoc.”). 
 80.  See Bill Garner, Here's Everywhere You Should Enable Two-Factor 
Authentication Right Now, LINKEDIN (Sept. 13, 2014), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140930132117-13789516-here-s-everywhere-
you-should-enable-two-factor-authentication-right-now (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (listing “services that support two-factor authentication”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81.  On how to implement 2FA on the services that provide them, see id. 
 82.  See Advanced Sign-in Security for Your Google Account, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 10, 2011), 
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/advanced-sign-in-security-for-your.html 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“[W]e’ve developed an advanced opt-in security 
feature called 2-step verification that makes your Google Account significantly 
more secure by helping to verify that you're the real owner of your account.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83.  See Duo Labs, Estimating Google’s Two-Factor (2SV) Adoption with 
Pen, Paper, and Poor Math, DUO (May 15, 2015), 
https://duo.com/blog/estimating-googles-two-factor-2sv-adoption (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (“Despite having very low adoption rates in terms of % of total 
users, large service providers like Google, Microsoft, Apple, etc have hundreds of 
million[s] of users, dwarfing the 2FA deployments of even the largest enterprise 
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official numbers are available from Google, a 2015 guesstimate 
suggests that only 6.5% of Google’s 600 million users use 2FA.84 A 
published 2015 study, which tried to reset Google accounts to test 
if they had 2FA enabled, came up with a 6.4% estimate.85 
Given the palpable benefits of this more secure standard, 
why isn’t it the default industry norm? I would argue that the 
inconvenience threshold for standard adoption is pretty low. Even 
minor actual or perceived inconvenience to users hampers the 
adoption of a security standard. Scientific studies have shown 
that ease of use and required cognitive effort are both relevant 
factors in 2FA implementation.86 I do not see 2FA becoming a 
market dominating standard unless the inconvenience cost is 
significantly lowered for end users.87 
The following table summarizes available adoption data for 
2FA: 
                                                                                                     
use cases.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  THANASIS PETSAS, GIORGOS TSIRANTONAKIS, ELIAS ATHANASOPOULOS & 
SOTIRIS IOANNIDIS, FORTH, TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION: IS THE WORLD READY? 
QUANTIFYING 2FA ADOPTION 1 (2015), www.necoma-
project.eu/m/filer_public/61/96/6196fc57-324b-490e-b958-
44111220656a/eurosec15.pdf. 
 86.  See EMILIANO DE CRISTOFARO, HONGLU DU, JULIEN FREUDIGER & GREG 
NORCIE, PARC, A COMPARATIVE USABILITY STUDY OF TWO-FACTOR 
AUTHENTICATION 2, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a3d8/
fab13263998bf2bbbb57f2d2d028aaae6719.pdf (finding “that three metrics—
ease-of-use, required cognitive efforts, and trustworthiness—are enough to 
capture key factors affecting the usability of 2F technologies”).  
 87.  Tellingly, the adoption rate for 2FA on the enterprise side was more 
than 30% in 2014. See More Enterprises Plan to Strengthen Access Security with 
Multi-factor Authentication, GEMALTO (May 21, 2014), 
https://safenet.gemalto.com/news/2014/authentication-survey-2014-reveals-
more-enterprises-adopting-multi-factor-authentication/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (“37 percent of organizations now use [2FA] for a majority of employees—
up from 30 percent last year.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Users on the enterprise side, of course, do not enjoy autonomy in 
deciding whether or not to use 2FA since, when implemented, it is the default 
and only option, rather than an opt in. RAND published an NIST sponsored 
study on 2FA adoption on the enterprise side, which found that “user resistance 
after implementation is a nonissue” within organizations. See Martin C. Libicki, 
Edward Balkovich, Brian A. Jackson, Rena Rudavsky & Katharine Watkins 
Webb, Influences on the Adoption of Multifactor Authentication, RAND CORP. 
(2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR937.html (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (providing a link to a copy of the study) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 88.  See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (discussing estimates of 
Google 2FA usage). 
 89.  See jimio, Getting Started with Login Verification, TWITTER (May 22, 
2013), https://blog.twitter.com/2013/getting-started-with-login-verification (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“Today we’re introducing a new security feature to better 
protect your Twitter account: login verification.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 2FA was implemented after a major hack in February 
2013 which affected 250,000 accounts. For a detailed account of that hack, see 
Cass Jones, Twitter Says 250,000 Accounts have been Hacked in Security 
Breach, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/feb/02/twitter-hacked-accounts-
reset-security (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 90.  Number of Monthly Active Twitter Users Worldwide from 1st Quarter 
2010 to 4th Quarter 2016 (in Millions), STATISTICA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-
users/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 91.  See Francis Bea, Why We’re Cautiously Optimistic about Twitter’s New 
Authentication System, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/twitter-has-introduced-a-new-
authentication-system-and-were-cautiously-optimistic-about-it-heres-why/ (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (estimating “that Twitter will face the normal ‘legacy’ two 
step adoption rate, meaning that just between 0.5 percent and 2 percent of users 
will bother to add this two-factor authentication method”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Facebook May 201192 
1 billion  
estimated93 
No public data  
available, but given 
how involved the  
set-up process is, I 
would guesstimate 
the same legacy 
adoption rate as 
Twitter, i.e., 0.5 to 
2%. 
Dropbox August 201294 500 million < 1%95 
e) Loading . . . . Privacy: Why does Tor Adoption Stink?  
Why does Tor adoption stink? Because it’s an onion router.96 
Tor is a pro privacy service that, inter alia, anonymizes internet 
browsing by routing traffic through multiple random servers, 
                                                                                                     
 92.  Andrew Song, Introducing Login Approvals, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2011), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/introducing-login-
approvals/10150172618258920/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93.  Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 
2016 (in Millions), STATISTICA 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-
users-worldwide/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 94.  See Brian Krebs, Dropbox Now Offers Two-Step Authentication, KREBS 
ON SEC. (Aug. 12, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/08/dropbox-now-offers-
two-step-authentication/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“Online file-backup and 
storage service Dropbox has begun offering a two-step authentication feature to 
help users beef up the security of their accounts. The promised change comes 
less than a month after the compromise of a Dropbox employee’s account 
exposed many Dropbox user email addresses.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 95.  See Brian Krebs, Dropbox Smeared in Week of Megabreaches, KREBS ON 
SEC. (June 16, 2016), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/06/dropbox-smeared-in-
week-of-megabreaches/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“According to Dropbox’s 
Patrick Heim, less than one percent of the Dropbox user base is taking 
advantage of the company’s two-factor authentication feature, which makes it 
much harder for thieves and other ne’er-do-wells to use stolen passwords”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96.  Bazinga! (And apologies!) 
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which cannot read the data in transit.97 As described on Tor’s 
website: 
Tor’s users employ this network by connecting through a 
series of virtual tunnels rather than making a direct 
connection, thus allowing both organizations and individuals 
to share information over public networks without 
compromising their privacy. Along the same line, Tor is an 
effective censorship circumvention tool, allowing its users to 
reach otherwise blocked destinations or content. Tor can also 
be used as a building block for software developers to create 
new communication tools with built-in privacy features.98 
The Tor network forms part of both EFF’s99 and Snowden’s100 
recommended privacy tools as a key privacy enhancer and anti-
surveillance tool. While installing and setting up Tor is not 
particularly cumbersome, using it is a fairly painful experience. 
Firstly, to ensure total privacy protection, users have to follow 
digital hygiene, which is highly implausible for a typical user. 
Sample these recommendations from Ubergizmo for optimal Tor 
usage: 
Use HTTPS instead of HTTP whenever possible. 
Disable Java, JavaScript, and Flash because these could be 
used to identify your IP. 
Don’t use your real email/name on Tor websites. 
                                                                                                     
 97.  See infra note 98 and accompanying text (describing Tor). 
 98.  See Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.htm
l.en (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 99.  See How to: Use Tor for Windows, EFF, 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-tor-windows (last updated Nov. 4, 2015) 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“For people who might need occasional anonymity 
and privacy when accessing websites, Tor Browser provides a quick and easy 
way to use the Tor network.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 100.  See mikeperry, This is What a Tor Supporter Looks Like: Edward 
Snowden, TOR PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2015), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/what-tor-
supporter-looks-edward-snowden (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Edward 
Snowden as stating that “Tor is a critical technology, not just in terms of privacy 
protection, but in defense of our publication right—our ability to route around 
censorship and ensure that when people speak their voices can be heard”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Don’t download files (via P2P) using Tor. 
Don’t log into services that can be tracked to you (official 
email, social media…) 
Prevent or Delete browser cookies which can be used to track 
you (Tor Browser does it automatically) 
Avoid using Google since it can track users by multiple ways 
(for example, Ads, Android, Chrome, or Search). Others do it, 
but no-one has a wider net as Google, and all this information 
could potentially be cross-referenced to identify a user.101 
Secondly, Tor takes three to four times the time to load web 
pages compared to other web browsers, and can almost feel like 
good old dial-up at times.102 In the world of millisecond 
optimizations, I would argue that this strongly impacts 
adoption.103 I tried Tor and stopped using it on account of its 
                                                                                                     
 101.  Dilawer Soomro, What is Tor & How to Use It Properly, UBERGIZMO 
(June 28, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.ubergizmo.com/articles/tor/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 102.  See Joel Hruska, Snowden-Approved: The ‘Citizenfour’ Hacker’s 
Toolkit, EXTREME TECH (Mar. 20, 2015, 9:23 AM), 
https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/201636-snowden-approved-the-
citizenfour-hackers-toolkit (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“One caveat about using 
Tor for anonymous browsing is that the performance isn’t going to be what 
you’re used to from a standard connection.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 103.  It will be interesting to see how Google’s open source mobile HTML 
webpage standard, called “AMP,” will perform. AMP serves up cached content 
(in some cases from Google’s servers) to mobile browsers at a median loading 
speed of 0.7 seconds. James A. Martin, 8 Things you Need to Know about Google 
AMP, CIO (July 6, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/3091071/search/8-
things-you-need-to-know-about-google-amp.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). AMP supporting websites get a 
thunderbolt icon next to their name in Google search results, and a boost in 
search results. See id. (noting that although “AMP is not directly a search 
engine ranking factor,” an AMP website will be higher ranked than a non-AMP 
website if all other factors are equal). eBay is already partially implementing 
AMP. See id. (reporting that “on June 30, eBay announced that its AMP-
powered mobile shopping experience was live”). AMP’s chief drawback seems to 
be that it will interfere with analytics since it will be impossible to say with 
certainty where content will be served up from- Google’s cache or the canonical 
‘original’ version. See id. (“AMP ‘creates a potential challenge on the analytics 
side, as it's impossible to be 100 percent sure where a publisher's content will be 
loaded from, as well as complications with visitor identification due to tight 
cookie restrictions,’ says [Adobe Analytics product manager Trevor] Paulsen.”) 
AMP also imposes cookie restrictions. Id. For more information about Google’s 
AMP, see generally AMP PROJECT, https://www.ampproject.org/ (last visited 
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speed limitations. A 2011 market report by Kissmetrics states 
that 40% of people abandon a website that takes more than three 
seconds to load, and 47% of consumers expect a web page to load 
in two seconds or less.104 
I would argue that Tor falls afoul of Ann Cavoukian’s fourth 
foundational PbD principle of full functionality.105 This principle 
encourages design, which satisfies all legitimate objectives, and 
not just the privacy goals.106 Ignoring speed and user convenience 
is arguably a PbD fail.107  
The following table summarizes Tor usage statistics: 
                                                                                                     
Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 104.  See Sean Work, How Loading Time Affects Your Bottom Line, 
KISSMETRICS, https://blog.kissmetrics.com/loading-time/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2017) (finding that “website visitors tend to care more about speed than all the 
bells and whistles we want to add to our websites” and providing related 
statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 105.  See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 3–4 (2011), https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-
uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf (discussing the fourth principle, which 
Cavoukian titles “Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum”). 
 106.  See id. at 3 (“Privacy by Design is doubly-enabling in nature, 
permitting full functionality—real, practical results and beneficial outcomes to 
be achieved for multiple parties.”) 
 107.  In fairness, it should be noted that Tor could comport with the general 
PbD maxim that different privacy/security is appropriate depending on the 
sensitivity of the data. See id. at 4 (noting that “the security of personal 
information [is] generally commensurate with the degree of sensitivity” of the 
data). One might not want to use Tor for everything because of the high 
transaction cost, but it might be worthwhile in other scenarios (e.g., 
communications between political dissidents in authoritarian environments). 
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Table 4: Tor Usage 
 
Number of 
Users in 2016 
~1.7 million.108 It may be unfair to compute 
percentage use based on global internet users, 
or number of desktop internet browser users, 
but it’s safe to say that Tor browsing accounts 
for less than 1% of the desktop browsing 
activity since it fails to show up in any online 





Daily US users 
 
50–100 for every 100,000 users (i.e., a best use 
case of 0.1%).110 
 
We can now turn to the regulatory implications of 
standards/technologies that are more successful than Tor and 
come to define the market. 
IV. Implications for Regulation 
What are the regulatory implications if a standard is widely 
diffused through the industry and not implemented only by a few 
actors? Would a website which gathers information over HTTP 
rather than HTTPS be exposing itself to regulatory risk? 
The FTC could theoretically address such cases using both 
the deception and unfairness doctrines.111 If the website has 
                                                                                                     
 108.  Users, TOR METRICS, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
country.html?start=2016-01-01&end=2016-12-31&country=all&events=off (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 109.  See, e.g., Browser Statistics, W3SCHOOLS, 
http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (showing that, 
in February 2017, the browsers Chrome, IE/Edge, Firefox, Safari, and Opera 
accounted for 98.5% of W3Schools’s web traffic combined) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110.  Users, TOR METRICS, https://metrics.torproject.org/oxford-anonymous-
internet.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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promised that it is “secure” in its advertising or its privacy policy, 
failure to implement a standard security practice may be 
deceptive. 
Non-implementation of a standard could also lead to an FTC 
unfairness action. In 1980, the FTC adopted the FTC Policy 
Statement on Unfairness, and, in 1994, Congress codified the 
current limitation on the Agency’s power to find an act or practice 
unfair.112 In relevant part, it reads:  
The Commission shall have no authority . . . to declare unlaw-
ful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice 
is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In de-
termining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commis-
sion may consider established public policies as evidence to be 
considered with all other evidence. Such public policy consid-
erations may not serve as a primary basis for such determina-
tion.113
 
Consumers are arguably unable to address the harms caused 
from poor privacy or security standards by themselves (short of 
not using the services in question). There is no real 
countervailing benefit to consumers from poorer security (except 
for potentially cheaper services). The arguments against such 
action under the unfairness doctrine would be the fact that there 
is no substantial “injury” to consumers, and that prescribing 
standards does seem to be based on something analogous to 
public policy considerations.  
Market participants I spoke to were of the view that it is 
inequitable to expect them to be treated as having constructive 
notice that the non-implementation of a widely adopted standard 
amounts to “unfairness.” The FTC has also been circumspect in 
its use of the unfairness doctrine, and in the context of the 
internet, has mostly invoked it in egregious cases.114 
                                                                                                     
 111.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 112.  CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 131 (2016).  
 113.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 114.  See J. Howard Beales, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, 
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Nonetheless, it is not entirely far-fetched to think that the 
non-implementation of a widely diffused standard could form the 
subject matter of an FTC complaint. There are a number of cases 
and practices that could lend support to such a complaint. For 
example, the FTC has brought actions against defendants for 
insecure data practices that fault the standards deployed by 
defendants (without going a step further and prescribing the 
standard that they should have used instead).115 The FTC’s 
treatment of data security practices under the unfairness 
doctrine originated in 2005 with the BJ Wholesale Case,116 where 
the defendant allegedly stored and transmitted customer credit 
card data in an insecure manner without encryption, and agreed 
to modify its practices under the terms of a consent order.117  
More recently, in the 2015 case of Wyndham,118 the Third 
Circuit upheld the FTC’s authority to bring a complaint against 
the defendant for insecure data security practices under the 
unfairness doctrine.119 The FTC also separately alleged 
deception.120 The court found that the FTC’s statute gave the 
defendant fair notice of such potential liability.121 The statute was 
held to place an obligation upon the defendant to weigh the 
probability and magnitude of harms to consumers caused by its 
                                                                                                     
Fall, and Resurrection, FTC (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (noting that “in order for a practice to be unfair, the 
injury it causes must be (1) substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits, and (3) 
one that consumers cannot reasonably avoid”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 115.  See, e.g., In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 42-3160, 2005 WL 
2395788, at *4 (Sept. 20, 2005) (ordering “that Respondent obtain an 
assessment and report (an “Assessment”) from a qualified, objective, 
independent third-party professional, using procedures and standards generally 
accepted in the profession”). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  See id. at *1 (“From at least November 1, 2003, until February, 2004, 
Respondent did not employ reasonable and appropriate measures to secure 
personal information collected at its stores. Among other things, 
Respondent . . . did not encrypt the information while in transit or when stored 
on the in-store computer networks.”). 
 118.  FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 119.  See id. at 247 (“We are therefore not persuaded by Wyndham’s 
arguments that the alleged conduct falls outside the plain meaning of ‘unfair.’”). 
 120.  Id. at 240. 
 121.  See id. at 256 (concluding that “Wyndham’s fair notice challenge fails”). 
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data security practices, and whether these costs outweighed any 
savings from not employing more secure practices.122 
Wyndham was a fairly egregious case, because the defendant 
corporation had no firewall at all, failed to use any encryption for 
customer data, was hacked thrice, and failed to take any remedial 
measures after the first two hacks.123 Nonetheless, it illustrates 
that market participants can be expected to read the tea leaves, 
and be “on notice” as to what they may perceive to be inchoate 
standards. 
Similarly, in the 2016 ASUS Case,124 the FTC brought an 
unfairness action against the defendant for lax security practices 
such as setting “admin” as the default username and password on 
all of its routers.125 Presumably ASUS should have known that 
this was not a reasonable standard to deploy. 
FTC attorneys also look to the SANS Institute and Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) lists of common security 
vulnerabilities to identify case priorities.126 These thus serve as a 
market floor in terms of security standard setting, and breaching 
that floor could have regulatory consequences. 
All of the above precedents and practices cumulatively point 
to the fact that the FTC does often believe that there is a market 
standard that actors must meet. In view of this, industry actors 
should stay abreast of emerging privacy and security standards, 
and also consider adding a cost-benefit analysis of widely diffused 
security standards to their FTC cheat-sheet.   
                                                                                                     
 122.  See id. at 255–56 (setting out the factors relating to whether an entity 
is on notice as to the application of § 45(n)). 
 123.  See id. at 241 (discussing Wyndham’s failure “to use ‘readily available 
security measures’”). 
 124.  In the Matter of ASUSTeK Computer, Inc., No. 142-3156, 2016 WL 
4128217 (July 18, 2016). 
 125.  See id. at *6 (reprimanding ASUSTeK for “allow[ing] consumers to 
retain the weak default login credentials username ‘admin’ and password 
‘admin’ for the admin console”). 
 126.  HOOFNAGLE, supra note 112, at 233. 
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V. Conclusions 
A few conclusions can be drawn from the above 
discussion.Firstly, when a privacy standard becomes industry 
dominant on account of a major actor, the cost to other market 
participants appears not to affect its diffusion. This should be 
distinguished from “cost” to consumers, both in monetary terms 
and in terms of convenience. Standards should be designed to as 
seamless as possible from a consumer standpoint in order to 
encourage their adoption. When standards can be introduced 
through routine updates, their uptake is significantly higher. 
Product designers and engineers should consider using a modified 
version of Gandhi’s Talisman:127 Will the feature being introduced 
improve the privacy or security of the least tech savvy user you 
have ever encountered?128 
Secondly, individual market actors have the capacity to 
significantly improve the privacy and security of a 
disproportionate number of people on account of network domino 
effects.129 This should encourage those trying to build more secure 
                                                                                                     
 127.  See 2 MAHATMA GANDHI, THE LAST PHASE 65 (1958). 
I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the 
self becomes too much with you, apply the following test. Recall the 
face of the poorest and the weakest man [woman] whom you may 
have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be 
of any use to him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it 
restore him [her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In 
other words, will it lead to swaraj [freedom] for the hungry and 
spiritually starving millions? Then you will find your doubts and your 
self melt away.  
 128.  In a fascinating study, it was found that when Signal users were 
subjected to an artificial man in the middle attack, twenty-one out of twenty-
eight users in the study failed to compare and verify their public keys to defeat 
the attack; indeed, a majority of study participants believed they had succeeded 
when they had failed. See generally SVENJA SCHRODER, MARKUS HUBER, DAVID 
WIND & CHRISTOPH ROTTERMANNER, WHEN SIGNAL HITS THE FAN: ON THE 
USABILITY AND SECURITY OF STATE-OF-THE-ART SECURE MOBILE MESSAGING 
(2016), https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/09%20when-signal-
hits-the-fan-on-the-usability-and-security-of-state-of-the-art-secure-mobile-
messaging.pdf (providing the results of the experiment). 
 129.  Though this paper does not consider enterprise technologies, it is 
interesting to note that there, as well, individual actors such as Jeff Jonas and 
Palantir Technolgies (Palantir)—both of whom are in the security and 
surveillance sector—can bake in features such as privacy by design, revocability 
(revoked credentials are reflected upstream and downstream across all data) 
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systems. Privacy advocates should also focus their efforts on 
those who already are, or are likely to become, significant actors 
in their digital spaces.  
Finally, it is worth trying to keep pace with and drive such 
innovation; if nothing else, you could end up financially 
benefiting by helping implement new standards on the backend.  
 
                                                                                                     
and audit logs (who looked at what, when, and for what purpose) into their 
products, and set the tone for that segment of the market. This is despite the 
fact that features such as audit logs can significantly increase costs since 
multiple copies of the same data set are required for audit logs, and even with 
cheap storage, these data sets are very large. The co-founder of Palantir, Alex 
Karp, claims they walk away from as high as 20% of projects for ethical reasons, 
and has expressed a commitment to privacy, stating, “We have to find places 
that we protect away from government so that we can all be the unique and 
interesting and, in my case, somewhat deviant people we’d like to be.” Grgory 
Maus, A (Pretty) Complete History of Palantir, SOC. CALCULATIONS (Aug. 11, 
2015), http://www.socialcalculations.com/2015/08/a-pretty-complete-history-of-
palantir.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
